How Pakistan’s Judiciary Lost Its Autonomy
Aasim Irshad | Published November 20, 2025
In Pakistan, the recent resignations of senior judges, abrupt structural reforms in the judiciary, and constitutional amendments that shift the balance of power raise a pressing question: are we witnessing isolated institutional adjustments, or the latest phase in a long-running erosion of judicial autonomy? Understanding the depth of this challenge requires looking beyond the headlines to a historical pattern in which the judiciary, at critical moments, aligned itself with extra-constitutional authority rather than resisting it. Only then can today’s resignations and proposed reforms be framed not as administrative decisions but as symptoms of a broader crisis in judicial self-governance.
Are senior judges resigning purely for personal reasons,
or because the system has become unworkable?
Central to this historical narrative is the figure of Justice Muhammad Munir, Chief Justice of Pakistan’s Federal Court in the mid‑1950s, who pioneered the so-called “doctrine of necessity” (nazriya‑e‑zarurat) in Pakistani jurisprudence. In the landmark case Federation of Pakistan v. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan (1955), Munir’s court upheld the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the Governor General, justifying the move on the maxim that “that which is otherwise unlawful is made lawful by necessity.” Two years later, in Dosso v. Federation of Pakistan (1958), the doctrine was invoked again to validate a military coup as a “successful revolution,” paving the way for a new constitutional order. Munir’s judgments effectively institutionalized a model of judicial deference to executive and military power rather than guardianship of constitutional constraint.
These precedent matters because judicial independence is not merely a matter of individual judges acting bravely or poorly in isolation. It is about institutions embedded in norms, standards, and culture. When courts legitimize executive overreach in the name of necessity, they send a signal: future actors will learn that the institution adapts rather than resists. That affects how judges view their role, how lawyers and litigants approach the courts, and how democratic actors anticipate judicial behavior. Over decades, the pattern has repeated: the judiciary, on occasion, acquiesced to rather than challenged executive or military encroachments.
When judicial independence fails, the foundations of democracy are inevitably weakened.
In recent months, the Pakistani judiciary has entered a phase that signals more than routine institutional churn – it points toward structural fragility. Two intertwined trends are clear. First, the structural re‑engineering of superior courts: delays in permanent Chief Justice appointments, spikes in acting appointments, and disputes over seniority and promotions all erode internal stability. Second, a wave of high‑level resignations and growing concerns expressed by sitting judges about systemic integrity. While each resignation may carry personal factors, the cumulative effect is structural – both reflect and reinforce a culture in which judicial independence is increasingly constrained.
To provide context, consider recent data: Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi of the Supreme Court resigned prematurely on 10 January 2024. He became “the seventh Supreme Court judge” known to resign before term end. Shortly after, Justice Ijazul Ahsan also resigned (11 January 2024) despite being in line for the country’s top judicial post. More recently, Justice Shahid Jamil Khan of Lahore High Court stepped down (3 February 2024) citing “personal reasons.” In early 2025, Justice Chaudhry Abdul Aziz also resigned from the Lahore High Court, citing personal circumstances. These departures, especially at senior levels of the judiciary, are remarkable and raise deeper questions.
Parallel to these resignations are structural shifts in the appointment and functioning of courts. The proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment aims to alter the judiciary’s role, create a new Constitutional Court, limit the jurisdiction of the existing apex court, and permit executive appointment of key judges. At the same time, senior judges such as Justice Athar Minallah have warned publicly of a judiciary under “continued capture” and called for a judicial conference. The structural reforms and resignations must therefore be read not as discrete events but as two sides of the same institutional trajectory: a judiciary increasingly constrained by its own internal disorder and external influence.
The logic is straightforward: when appointment mechanisms blur seniority, tenure or transparency, judges face higher risk of isolation, of being bypassed, of political pressure. Under such conditions, resignation may appear preferable to remaining in a system where autonomy is compromised. When resignations accumulate, they send a message: this institution is in decline.
This brings us back to a critical question: are senior judges resigning purely for personal reasons, or because the system has become unworkable? If the latter is true, then the resignations are symptomatic of declining judicial self‑governance rather than mere personnel turnover.
History guides us. The legacy of Justice Munir reminds us that an institutional pattern of deference to extra‑constitutional power did not emerge yesterday. His rulings set a precedent for a judiciary that adapts rather than resists. Today’s shift appears more structural amendments altering the court functions and appointment powers but the underlying issue remains the same. A judiciary that is subordinate in practice cannot act as an independent check.
Viewed through this lens, the current moment is not about “two judges resigning and a tweak in structure”. It is about a crisis of autonomy. Key questions arise for policymakers, the legal fraternity, and civil society: Do the current reforms and departures restore independence, or accelerate its erosion? Was the 27th Amendment formulated with meaningful consultation of the judiciary? Will resignations spur reform, or normalize retreat over resistance?
Will resignations spur reform, or normalize retreat over resistance?
One might conclude: the resignations, flawed appointment processes, and sweeping amendments, when seen together, reveal not a temporary disruption but a deepening crisis of judicial autonomy. Restoring that autonomy will demand more than rhetoric; it will require structural guarantees, cultural renewal, and vigilant oversight.
Structural guarantees must include transparent appointment and promotion procedures, fixed tenure, and protections against external interference. Cultural renewal must involve judges willing to uphold constitutional supremacy even when politically inconvenient, an empowered legal profession willing to defend judicial independence, and an attentive civil society prepared to hold institutions to account. When the infrastructure is weak and the culture compromised, a judiciary may formally exist but lack the strength to act as a genuine counter‑vailing power.
The stakes are high. A judiciary that cannot safeguard its autonomy cannot effectively protect citizens’ rights. When judicial independence fails, the foundations of democracy are inevitably weakened.
Pakistan now stands at a crucial juncture. Will this wave of resignations, structural uncertainty, and constitutional meddling result in a genuine break with the past and a reconstruction of judicial independence? Or will it become yet another episode in which institutional weakness, executive ambition, and public distrust combine to hollow out a key check on state power?
The answer depends not solely on the words of prominent judges but on the concrete rules, transparent processes, and safeguards that elevate the judiciary from a dependent extension of power to a genuine bulwark of constitutionalism. Without such measures, the judiciary may continue to serve but not protect the rights and liberties upon which democratic governance depends.
Aasim Irshad is a journalist specializing in socio-political analysis and historical perspectives. He can be reached at aasimirshad.pk@gmail.com
